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Founding a Republic of Laws:
The Rule of Law Ideal in Early American Constitutional Theory
by
Robert Moye

Introduction
Although there is a wealth of scholarship
available on the political and constitutional
theories of the American Founders, many
commentaries overlook or misunderstand
one of the most important elements in the
Framers' thought: their desire to implement
the rule of law ideal into the new national
government. Much of this confusion may
be attributed to contemporary disagreement
about what the rule of law actually implies,
and the remainder to a mistaken belief of
what the term meant for the Founders. In
current parlance, the term suggests only a
minimal equality--that no person should be
"above the law"--but the concept meant a
great deal more to the Founders.
During the nation's formative years,
American statesmen had a clear conception
of what the term "the rule of law" meant to
classical thinkers, as well as the ideal's

contemporary implications. Their constitutional experiment attempted, among other
things, to minimize the tendency toward
arbitrary government by incorporating the
rule of law ideal in their governing institutions and procedures. While most scholars
recognize the great care with which the
Founders refashioned the nation's authoritative institutions, they often ignore important
procedural aspects of constitutional theory;
some even exacerbate this mistake by dismissing certain of the Constitutions' procedural innovations as unsophisticated.
Fortunately, some scholars avoid such
errors. Noting the enormous difference
between rule by established legal procedures
and rule by an unpredictable human will,
George and Scarlett Graham observe that:
Underlying each principle, institution, and practice
explored by the Founders was one basic presupposition that was unchallenged by any theory of
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experience brought to their deliberations: the
government to be founded must be a government of
law rather than of men. (1977, xiii)

In this paper, I will attempt to show that the
American Founders' constitutional theories
were influenced by their perceptions of the
rule of law ideal and its procedural implications. I do not argue that the Founders were
uninspired by other sources (i.e. classical
economics, protestant religion, civic virtue,
or their faith in "enlightened" reason), but
rather that this type of explanation offers, at
best, only an incomplete picture of the
Founder's intentions. A truer picture of the
Framers' motivations must also include their
commitment to the rule of law ideal and its
traditional emphasis on legal procedures.
To liberal statesmen living before and
during the Founding era, there seemed to be
a fairly obvious, necessary connection between the rule of law and the legitimacy of
a government. Although they rarely employed the phrase "rule of law," they made
frequent references to the ideal and its
implications in a myriad of documented
discussions on the subject. The Founders
and their intellectual predecessors envisioned
the legal processes of any legitimate political
system as limited by certain procedural
norms implied by the rule of law ideal:
these included nulla poena sin lege (Usually
translated as "no punishment in the absence
of a crime"), due process, just compensa~on, trial by jury, the general and prospec~ve na~re of legal statutes, and the prohibition agamst ex post facto laws and bills of
attainder.
Given the Founders' commitment to
individual liberty, the line separating their
legal conventions from liberal political
theory often becomes tenuous or even
indiscernible. From the persp~tive of the
Framers, the legal process itself reflected an

informed political judgement on the value of
procedure. In fact, the rule of law has been
described as a political ideal which defines
~e nature of law itself and imposes limitations on government (Hayek 1960, 206).
Sor:ne modern commentators dispute this
claIm; but, for the Founders, the notion of
the rule of law was a legal ideal which
informed the time-honored procedures ordering a free society.

The Ori&ins and Development of an Ideal
The philosophers of ancient Greece and
Rome were among the first to formulate the
concrete implications of what later came to
be called "the rule of law." In his 1960
work ~ Constitution of Liberty, Austrian
economIst F. A. Hayek challenged the
pr~vailing ass~mption that ancient political
phIlosophy rejected an individualistic conception of personal liberty . He insisted that,
for many Greeks, government by legal
p~~u~es (which he calls isonomia) , as
dIStingUIshed from human will or caprice
entailed certain conditions. Those stan:
dards, as described by the lawgiver Solon,
were that 1) all citizens, regardless of class,
would share the same laws, and 2) that the
government would abide by known and
certain rules (Hayek 1960, 165). Hayek
further argued that many Greeks even preferred government by isonomia over demokratia, or equal participation, because established legal procedures protected their freedom (165). For the Greeks then, a free
government was a government of law, since
legal procedures, by definition, placed
limitations on the exercise of power in any
government that claimed legal sanction.
Spurred by the ancient Greeks most
liberal thinkers recognized that a l~w, as
opposed to a command or some other direc-
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tive, implied a certain generality of purpose
and prospectivity of scope (Wormuth 1949,
10). The equal, general, public, and prospective nature of human law suggested that
legal procedures, by definition, could serve
as an effective curb on sovereign caprice.
Equally important, while ill-suited to advance certain policy goals, the municipal
law could function as a facilitator for the
actions of an individual. In governments
which claimed to serve the people, the rule
of law ideal encouraged the rulers to restrain
their actions and protect the liberty of their
subjects. Even Plato, whom many commentators paint as a totalitarian, intimated that
"a primary function of government was to
protect and maintain the law of [and for] the
people" (Reynolds 1987, 83).
The influence of the classical rule of law
ideal was not wholly a Greek phenomena.
In ancient Rome, Cicero noted that freedom
should never be confused with lawlessness;
liberty actually hinged on the certainty
supplied by general rules. Such rules, or
leges legwn, served as both a guide for the
citizen and a restraint on the state (Hayek
1960, 167). Such a notion of liberty implied a relationship, analogous to a contract,
between the people and their rulers
(Reynolds 1987, 84). Indeed, the law functioned as an equally accessible protector of
the people's prerogatives (Hayek 1960,
166). Although this ideal did not reflect
later Imperial practices, the "recognized
ultimate basis" for all laws in ancient Rome
was professedly the will or consent of the
people themselves (Reynolds 1987, 84).
The ancient rule of law ideal received a
warm reception in sixteenth-century England. The terminology gradually changed
from the anglicized "isonomy" to "equality
before the law," or "a government of laws, "
and finally to "the rule of law," but the
concept of isonomia remained the same

(Hayek 1960, 164). In fact, legal equality
implied more in the traditional, British
context than an individual's formal standing
before a court. Hayek notes that the struggle between Parliament and the monarchy
further defmed the rule of law to include a
prohibition on the exercise of arbitrary
power: not simply power exercised by an
unauthorized source, but rather a usage in
violation of general, fundamental rules
(169). The rule of law principle of generality implied equality under the law, and prospectivity required that legal judgments be
based on the results of individual choices,
not on human caprice (Wormuth 1949,212).
Francis D. Wormuth has observed that
in classic constitutional theory, the doctrine
of separation of powers is a vehicle for
safeguarding the generality of rules: keeping the legislature from enforcing its own
laws, and the executive from judging its
own case (1949, 8). During the English
Civil Wars, John Lilburne, a leader of the
radical Leveler party, advocated separating
power among the distinct arms of the British
government organization as a way of confining the legislature to enacting only" general
and prospective rules" (Hickman 1983,
369). Although Parliament could not be
persuaded, nearly every American thinker of
the Founding era eventually accepted Montesquieu's separation of powers as an essential part of constitutional theory (369).
During the English Civil Wars this
"Enlightenment" conception of political
institutions managed to win the near-universal acceptance of ideas like common consent, the separation of powers, an independent judiciary, and written constitutions.
Significantly, each of these ideas is based on
the notion of the rule of law. Although in
Great Britain, especially just prior to the
Colonial rebellion, the classical concepts
were often subordinated to policy goals,
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they have remained an integral part of modern conceptions about legitimate government.

The Rule of Law in America

To a large degree, the American statesman
inherited their conceptions of the rule of law
ideal from their English forebears. However, they made important contributions of
their own, especially in relation to the importance of established legal procedures.
One commentator, in fact, has observed that
many substantive rights enjoyed under Anglo-American legal systems depended on
traditional, procedural guarantees (Reid
1988, 69). Historical documents yield an
abundant supply of subtle references to the
rule of law and its procedural implications,
but I discuss here only a few of the more
interesting.
First, in his 1765 Commentaries, William Blackstone made reference to certain
fundamental legal principles of any legitimate government. When discussing the
sanctity of private property, he remarked
that
[T]he great charter has declared that no freeman
shall be disseised, or divested of his freehold, or of
his liberties, or free customs, but by the judgement
of his peers, or by the law of the land (Kurland
and Lerner 1987, 586)

Though he was a fIrm believer in the Lockean version of natural law, Blackstone defIned concepts like due process and the trial
by jury as legal stipulations, not immutable
principles. The example cited above illustrates that, for him, the Magna Carta was an
agreement on legal procedures between
sovereign and subjects, not simply a powersharing arrangement between nobility and
monarchy.

Blackstone further remarks that the legal
relationship between individual property
rights and the governing authority is, and
should be, controlled by traditional practices
and procedures, such as that of "full indemnifIcation" for seized property (586). The
seizure of property was not absolutely prohibited; rather, it was constrained by social
conventions which reduced the prospects of
its use. This idea later found its way into
the U.S. Constitution in the requirement of
"just compensation" for the exercise of the
government's eminent domain (see Amendment V.).
Second, in a 1771 speech, preparatory to
a Boston election, Protestant minister John
Tucker touched on many aspects of the
nature and purposes of government. His
remarks, interwoven with familiar religious
rhetoric, imply not only that his audience
needed no lengthy justifIcations or explanations of his political assertions, but also that
his listeners shared with him a commitment
to certain fundamental principles. One of
his observations was that "all laws and rules
of government [must] be as plain as possible" (Hyneman and Lutz 1983, 164).
For Tucker, this seemed like a basic
requirement in any society that expected its
laws to be obeyed. Citing John Locke, he
mentions that readily understandable laws
preclude the exercise of tyrannical authority
in the guise of complicated legal procedures;
indeed, the very defInition of tyranny is the
exercise of the state's coercive power without the sanction of legality (164). While
Tucker was not the fIrst, or the last, of the
Founding era to defIne the boundaries of
political legitimacy in this way, his arguments in an ostensibly religious discourse
suggests that the principles of the rule of
law had already become widely accepted in
colonial America.
SignifIcantly, those
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principles were also universally accepted by
the American Founders.
Third, many of the Founders understood
the limitations that the use of the law, as
such, placed on a legislature's methods.
The rule of law demanded that, in addition
to binding a government to obey its own
rules (see Federalist #33), any particular law
should be a known and stable rule (Federalist #62). James Wilson observed that "law
is called a rule, in order to distinguish it
from a sudden, a transient, or a particular
order: uniformity, permanency, stability,
characterize a law" (West 1987, 153). In
colonial America, this concept served to
distinguish tyranny from political legitimacy;
a government rules by dispassionate laws
and a tyrant rules by pointed, prejudicial
commands and the force of his will.
Fourth, by 1776 most American thinkers
had accepted the postulate that all authority
wishing the sanction of legality must conform to the principles stipulated by the
people themselves, and additionally, must
adhere to certain time-honored principles of
conventional legal procedure. When George
Mason of Virginia wrote the Virginia Declaration of Rights, one of the models for the
Bill of Rights, he included a number of
traditional, procedural guarantees, especially
in the area of criminal law. Among them
are prohibitions against excessive bail, cruel
and unusual punishments, self-incrimination,
and guarantees of search by warrant, trial by
jury, criminal convictions by unanimous
vote, the right to confront one's accuser,
and the ability to call witnesses in one's
behalf (Kurland and Lerner 1987, 6). Although many today see these provisions as a
burden on society, to the Founders they
represented a nearly insurmountable procedural barrier to those who would exercise
arbitrary or tyrannical power.

Fifth, when the colonists made their
break with Great Britain, the Declaration of
Independence contained the straightforward
charge that Parliament and the Crown had
disregarded the legal methods incumbent
upon any government. The document's
arguments are based primarily on a violation
of traditional legal practices, not on moral
or philosophical considerations. Thomas
Jefferson, the principal author, carefully
defended the colonists' separation with
England on legal grounds, and the eloquence
of the preamble should not obscure the
conscious attempt to do so (Reynolds 1987,
89).
Note the substance of a few of the colonists' complaints against the Crown: subordinating an independent judiciary; abolishing
charters and laws; convening the legislatures
in inconvenient locations; obstructing naturalization laws; depriving citizens of the
right to trial by a jury; and in general,
"abolishing the free system of English
laws." In short, although the Founders did
believe in natural laws and principles, they
sought conventional, legal justifications for
their actions. For the colonists, the demands of natural law and traditional legal
procedure were coextensive (Wood 1969,
10).
Gordon Wood concludes that the Founding Fathers "revolted not against the English
constitution but on behalf of it" (1969, 10).
Though they selectively borrowed ideas
from radical writers most favorable to the
American experience, they truly believed
that they were protecting their rights as
Englishmen (13). The American statesmen
were astonished that the British government,
previously regarded as a defender of liberty,
could disregard its own traditions and claim
that Parliament superseded the law (Reid
1988,57). For them, the violation of established procedures, with no expectation of
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redress or change, justified a revolution.
Their defense was that the English Crown
had threatened their liberty by abandoning
the universally accepted principles of the
rule of law, and they expected to be vindicated in the eyes of all who took legitimate
government seriously.
Sixth and finally, John Adams recognized that the basis for any government that
espoused republican principles would be the
rule of law ideal. He used a variation of the
modern term in his 1776 Thoughts on Government, claiming that a republican form of
government was "an empire of laws, not of
men" (Kurland and Lerner 1987, 108). In
his 1787 Defence of the Government of the
United States, he further insisted that free
governments must depend on the laws for
their legitimacy, and that legal processes for
addressing grievances must be available to
every citizen.

The Rule or Law and the Constitution
F. A. Hayek has noted that, for the Founders, a constitution signified a commitment to
the rule of law, as well as a safeguard
against the exercise of arbitrary power--by
the legislature and by the people themselves
(1960, 178). Since conventional legal procedures were not to be sacrificed to shortterm policy goals, constitutionalism also
entailed a commitment to abide by long-term
principles instead of short-term interests
(179). Though a written constitution could
not preclude or ultimately frustrate the will
of the people, it could limit the means by
which a temporary majority can pursue its
objectives (180).
In short, constitutional arrangements
were agreements to abide by fundamental
procedural norms.
Lawrence Friedman
believes that:

Every citizen must look up to the laws, as his
master, his guardian, and his friend; and whenever
any of his fellow-citizens, whether magistrates or
subjects, attempt to deprive him of his right, he
must appeal to the laws ... (346)

American statesmen tended to look upon a written
constitution as a kind of social compact--a basic
agreement among citizens, and between citizens
and state, setting out mutual rights and duties, in a
permanent form (1983, 115).

Although I have cited only a few out of
innumerable possible examples, they reveal
that by 1787, the concept and terminology
of the rule of law ideal had permeated almost every level of American political
discourse. As in the classical civilizations,
the rule of law, instead of human capriciousness, was seen as the protector of individual
freedom. The Founding of the United States
of America entailed an ambitious attempt to
implement the rule of law ideal into the
constitution of the nation's new government.
Though it does not exhaust the concept's
definition or implications, constitutionalism
is based upon the rule of law ideal.

Among Americans, a constitution embodied
a society-wide agreement. The state and
federal constitutions actually created certain
rights and duties additional to those the
people naturally enjoyed. They also grounded the authority and the formal limitations
on government in the express or implied
consent of the people (115).
The whole point behind constitutionalism, and indeed behind the rule of law, was
to protect liberty. Prior to the Revolution,
Americans commonly believed that the
antithesis of liberty was arbitrary authority
(Reid 1988, 59). Traditionally, Americans
believed that the law's whole purpose and
reason for existence was to restrain or
thwart the exercise of such arbitrary power
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(63). For some liberty-minded Americans,
"there was no accusation against an official
more serious than that he sought to impose
arbitrary rule" (55). Eighteenth-century
Britons believed that the king was most
likely to exercise arbitrary power and the
colonists saw the danger stemming from
Parliament; but both agreed that liberty
became vulnerable when the state began to
govern by subjective prerogative (79).
John Phillip Reid believes that the colonists thought their liberty depended on two
things: 1) that the laws of a society must be
based on the consent of the governed; and 2)
that all laws must be subject to the traditional requirements of legal due process, not
administered by discretionary authority (80).
Echoing Cicero, he observes that law was
the "central pillar" of the Americans' traditionalliberty; it owed its existence to legally
defined boundaries and without them could
not exist (60). According to eighteenthcentury thinkers, the law essentially balanced the natural inequalities of individuals
(62), creating the security necessary to enjoy
private property rights. The fictional "exchange" of a portion of one's personal
liberty for protection was widely endorsed
as a useful idea (68-71). Therefore the rules
and conventions of a well-established legal
process protected the people in the enjoyment of their property (and other) rights.
Although nearly all the Founders believed that substantive rights emerged from
nature, they recognized that one could only
enjoy such rights as a member of a civil
society. In his most interesting argument,
Reid contends that the rights the Americans
enjoyed were actually simple legal stipulations; in certain cases, rights well-founded
in tradition received the appellation of "natural" as well (64). In other words, many
basic rights were legal instead of natural.
Procedures like due process, compensation

for seizure of property, jury trials, and the
need for a warrant authorizing a search, all
helped reduce the likelihood that the state
could use coercion arbitrarily. Such conventions tended to preserve the ability to
freely pursue one's individual initiatives
within the boundaries prescribed by law. Ex
post facto laws and bills of attainder are
specifically prohibited by the American
constitution (and others) because they frustrate efforts to use the law as a guide for
individual initiative.
In this context, liberty for the American
Founders meant living under a constitutional
government and, in its eighteenth-century
formulation, constitutionalism was the notion
of rule by law in a civil society (74). Significantly, the procedural safeguards which
served as a protection against the tendency
towards arbitrary government formed the
crux of the Americans' constitutionalliberties (77). The notion of freedom that later
came to be associated with America's most
democratic principles was wholly a new idea
(77). "American Whigs," Reid notes, "continued to associate 'true liberty' with 'legitimate government,' and to define liberty as
government under the rule of law" (84).
For the Americans, the rule of law was, in
fact, constituted by customary legal procedures (85).

The Difficulties in Modern Discourse
While many critics have explored the Framers' emphasis on the rule of law, most
modem commentators tend to disregard the
procedural aspect of constitutionalism and
attempt to explain the phenomena in other
terms. Few have recognized any underlying
significance for the Founders' constitutional
theories. Charles Hyneman, for example,
cogently observes that since the Founders
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established the new national government by
legal enactment, the actions of the government were to be limited by laws (1977, 7).
Yet he then denies that the Founders hoped
to cement the rule of law ideal into a preferred position in the federal system. In his
modem view, the stability guaranteed by
legal procedures is necessarily subordinate
to public policies designed to advance the
people's collective well-being (11). Echoing
Hyneman's sentiments, Donald Lutz presents the rule of law as only one of several
competing political theories among the
Founders, and not as one with any particular
significance (1977, 62).
Hyneman and Lutz, at least, try to account for the rule of law's procedural aspect. Many commentators oversimplify the
rule of law ideal and its implications, concentrating instead on other assumptions or
facets of constitutionalism. Many careful
thinkers even dismiss the rule of law ideal
as simplistic. The most facile, yet frequently heard, objection to the idea of the rule of
law is that any government framed and
administered by fallible men cannot really
be a government of law, since it must ultimately rest on subjective political judgments.
Of course that statement begs the question by ignoring the enormous difference
between an essentially arbitrary system
based on human will and bounded by caprice, and one that is constituted, albeit
imperfectly, by traditional, procedural conventions. Most of the more fruitful, contemporary discussions on the Founders'
constitutional theories attempt to draw out
normative implications from the rule of law
ideal, yet even these often ignore the efficacy of established procedures as a constitutional curb on arbitrariness.
George and Scarlett Graham, for example, note that the Founders simply assumed

that 1) the government would be bound by
the same rules as the citizens, and 2) that
there would be certain permanent restraints
on government powers; otherwise their
efforts to write and ratify a constitution
become "nonsense" (1977, xiii). They even
conclude that the Constitution was based
upon the rule of law (xiii). Yet they miss a
prime opportunity to explore the reasons
why the Framers would prefer the rule of
law over any of their other possibilities.
In yet another case, although he recognizes that the Founders were profoundly
influenced by the classical notions of the
rule of law, Francis D. Wormuth criticizes
their views as naive. He asserts that, regardless of the generality or prospectivity of
a given rule, its content makes the real
difference; immoral laws can be administered impartially to everyone's detriment
(1949, 214). While this is, of course, true,
the point that Wormuth misses is that such
a risk is present in any legal system. Yet a
commitment to an impartial administration
of the laws, which purports to bind the
rulers as well as the citizens, does have the
tendency to minimize the likelihood that any
government will enact oppressive laws. For
the Founders, the impartial administration of
any rules was preferable to an existence
wholly dependent on a government's whim
and pleasure.
More recently, Thomas G. West has
offered a considered account of constitutionalism by attempting to ground its
assumptions in classical teleology. Taking
his arguments from the Federalist, he indicates that for the Founders all governments
shared the divine charge to advance the
welfare of their subjects (1987, 150). With
this in mind, he locates the Federalist's
treatment of the rule of law ideal in an
interesting combination of end-oriented
human reason and popular consent. He
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mentions the concept's classical definition
by observing that laws, as such, should
apply to large classes of people, not to
individuals, and that they should be public
and reasonably stable (153).
A written constitution, he continues,
should by definition bind the officials who
administer the government; it is alterable
only by the people, and not by legislative
enactment (156). For West
The rule of law, in sum, is a governmental practice
designed to make as likely as possible the coincidence of the two requirements of just government:
that it be by the consent of the people, and that it
secure the safety and happiness of society. The
law aims to embody the public's reason by requiring ... reasoned discussion and a rule of universal
application (153-54).

In at least one sense, West hints at the
argument offered in this paper. Requiring
the public's reasoned discussion on a given
decision seems analogous to my emphasis on
procedural norms; and his Kantian rules of
"universal application" do suggest the kinds
of general, prospective, and equal standards
discussed earlier. However, West hopes
that the rule of law can secure not only the
"safety" of stability and order, but the happiness of the people as well--which mayor
may not admit the kind of restrictions to
which they would readily consent. Balancing the two demands, consent and human
felicity, may actually make unreasonable
demands on fallible human reason. His
argument has Aristotelian overtones in that
it considers that the proper place of law is to
serve as the embodiment of human reason,
instead of an admittedly imperfect substitute.
In this sense, then, West seems to be more
optimistic about human nature and passions
than were the authors of the Federalist, who
were clearly influenced by the philosophy of
David Hume (White 1987, 198). In his

hopes that legal methods can successfully
direct society towards virtuous aims, West
runs into the precise problems of human
nature addressed by the Founders.
The Framers were aware of the inner
contradiction of popular government:
though the people are sovereign they are
often inclined to choose badly, at least in the
short run. If a people lost their capacity for
virtue they would become incapable of selfgovernment.
West points out that the
Founders were sure that a virtueless society
could not long remain free (see Federalist
#63 and #55); but the Founders realized that
virtue could only be encouraged by judiciouslyarranged institutions, not orchestrated by constitutional fiat. West seems to
hold out the hope that unaided human reason
can protect liberty. Sadly, it cannot.
Another approach used to justify the rule
of law ideal implicit in the Constitution
stems from the assumptions of the Enlightenment: that a society arranged around
certain models tends to control the worst
excesses of human nature. This is probably
the most popular explanation offered by
contemporary commentators.
David F.
Epstein defends this approach, taking as his
starting point James Madison's contention in
Federalist #57 that the object of any state's
constitution should be to recruit the wisest
and most virtuous men as the rulers, and
then to structure the government institutions
in a way that will encourage the exercise of
their virtue while they hold temporary office. Citing the example of the U.S. Senate,
he observes that the "constitution thus not
only grants powers, but also arranges offices
so as to encourage those powers to be used
well" (1990, 93).
He avoids the difficulties lurking in a
teleological scheme by contending that the
Founders were primarily concerned with
avoiding the evils of society, not with en-
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couraging the rational pursuit of aims adjudged socially worthy. Since rulers are
fallible mortals, they are likely to err, or
disagree, in their conceptions of the good.
Therefore the Founders believed that future
rulers only needed to know how to avoid the
dangers of arbitrary government (Epstein
1990,94). Frequent elections, which would
rotate the people's representatives in and out
of office, would guarantee that the rulers'
efforts always reflected the aspirations of the
people, and not their own personal ambitions (97). Thus "the Founders," he claims,
"looked not to a self-abnegating virtue to
guarantee public-spirited intentions but to a
self-aggrandizing spirit that would provoke
public-benefiting actions" (97).
Epstein correctly asserts that constitutionalism, as a way of structuring government, places both written and unwritten
restrictions on the ruling institutions (1990,
107). A written constitution cannot forbid
everything that the state might illegitimately
attempt, nor can it define every right enjoyed by the people or the degrees to which
power may be abused; the people reserve
certain unwritten limitations on the government's powers (107).
These unwritten
norms or standards are contained in, and
part of, the rule of law ideal. Epstein defines the rule of law as that which compels
the governors to control the exercise of their
own power. Finally, he notes that, concretely, the rule of law requires prospective
laws and a separation of powers.
However, Epstein believes that the rule
of law ideal is an incomplete constitutional
foundation for the following three reasons.
First, not all government activities are part
of the legal process; for example, the president has nearly unfettered power to conduct
war. Secondly, enforcing rules that are
themselves unvirtuous does not promote
virtue among the populace. And third, even

carefully separated powers can be usurped
and taken over by an ambitious branch or
individual (1990, 108). He sees the Founders' solution to these weaknesses in the
establishment of checks and balances which
distribute powers among different branches,
making each branches less dependent on the
good will of the others. The presidential
veto, a bicameral Congress, and the process
of judicial review tend to compensate politically for any defect in the legal process
(110).
Epstein's description of the failures of
the rule of law falls into several common
errors. Initially, he doesn't see that the
delegation of all constitutional powers,
including the president's war-making power,
is itself subject to the legal process and is
actually constrained (albeit loosely) by legal
and procedural barriers. His criticisms of
the ideal seems to be based on the mistaken
notion that incorporating the rule oflaw into
a system will lead to the best result in each
situation. No system can guarantee that.
The rule of law only tends to protect the
freedom of individuals because its procedural requirements discourage the abuse of
power. Finally, there is nothing in the
system of checks and balances that mends
the defects of the legal process, unless he
limits his defmition of that process to Congressional legislation. But that was not the
Founders' approach. Since it is a foundation, the rule of law is compatible with the
political conventions which shape our system.
A final way of fitting the rule of law into
American constitutionalism involves the
moral requirements of a just society. Ellis
Sandoz takes this approach and for him the
rule of law is synonymous with a free government (1990, 117). A government dedicated to preserving liberty and pursuing the
good of its citizens (instead of the good of
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its rulers), is one that is built upon a moral
framework adequate to the task (117-18).
He further notes that in Revolutionary
speeches, the call for justice is used interchangeably with the call for the rule of (or
by) law (201). Interestingly, he recognizes
that for those of the Founding era laws
universally entailed the people's common
consent, publicity, and equality under the
law (118-19). He then grounds the requirements of the rule of law in the dictates of
morality, not in tradition or conventional
procedures (120).
He views the Founders' efforts as "skillfully calculated" to encourage the rule of
divine reason in the affairs of men. Since
the Founders were aware that the occasional
ugliness of human nature could destroy even
the best social arrangements, the separation
of powers and a system of checks and balances neutralizes the problem of human
ambition (41-42).
The 'government of laws and not of men' ... is
precisely an insistence that the tyranny of the
passions (including those of the majority as well as
those of the single tyrant) be averted by having
'God and reason alone rule' (39).

Sandoz sees the political theories of the
Founders as profoundly influenced by their
religious convictions. Indeed they were.
But his idea of a cultural consensus--a subtle
blend of classical political theory and protestant theology--misses the mark. The Founders firmly believed in traditional religious
values, but they did not all share the convictions of John Adams--which Sandoz often
equates with those of the entire group. The
Founders' constitutional achievement was an
ambitious attempt to reduce arbitrariness by
establishing procedural norms that would
guarantee the stability, predictability, and
responsibility of the new government.

The moral reasoning Sandoz emphasizes
is certainly not incompatible with the Framers' procedural standards, such reasoning is
actually an effective support for the rule of
law. But constitutional conventions, as
such, do not depend upon morality for their
strength nor are they grounded in moral
demands. Moral reasoning would be hardpressed to justify the necessity of such
entities as due process, the jury trial, the
writ of habeas corpus, and the separation of
powers.
Additionally, although constitutionalism's assumptions about individual
liberty are supported by traditional moral
and religious values, the fact that the U.S.
Constitution (unlike the Declaration of
Independence) contains no outward manifestation of religious faith should indicate
something. At the very least, it suggests
that the Founders did not wish to stipulate
truths about government along partisan lines
of argument. At most, it implies that embodying traditional or religious values in the
very structures and functions of government
is not quite what the Founders had in mind.

The Limits of the Rule of Law
Although the rule of law ideal formed the
basis for many of their conceptions about
political legitimacy and constitutional government, the colonists recognized that the
rule of law ideal couldn't guarantee their
freedom (Reid 1988, 81). An ideal is not
self-enforcing. The Founders were convinced that if a people lacked the necessary
respect for the laws or for their fellow
citizens, then shielding individual freedom
through a legal process amounts to a hollow,
theoretical barrier (Wood 1969, 42). If,
however, a nation shares certain fundamental beliefs about the purposes behind the
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limitation of governmental authority, constitutionalism does tend to protect individual
liberty because it places limits on the state's
use of law and coercion, (Hayek 1960, 183;
Hickman 1983, 379). Many of the Founders, echoing Montesquieu, even linked the
freedom of a society to the moral fiber of its
people (Wood 1969, 35; Vetterli and Bryner
1987, 73). "A real community of shared
virtue is, by the Founding Fathers' analysis,
ultimately essential if free government is to
be supportable" (42).
The Founders' views presupposed the
existence of certain morals, traditions, and
practices, in both individuals and groups,
that would act as a restraint on any free
association. If any society proved itself
unable to exercise simple self-discipline, its
citizens were obviously incapable of selfgovernment and ripe for authoritarian domination. Laws, and even the rule of law,
would reflect the character of a people.
While the Framers believed that rights were
in the abstract real, they also recognized that
rights had no protection outside of a society's norms and conventions. This fact led
James Madison to the conclusion that "public opinion [ultimately] sets the bounds to
every government, and is the real sovereign

in every free one" (Kurland and Lerner
1987, 73).

Conclusions
As heirs of a rich heritage of political philosophy, the American Founders clearly
understood the concepts which formed the
basis for the rule of law ideal. Even before
the Constitutional Convention, they were
sure that the ancient concept should form the
basis of their structural and procedural
efforts. Although the Framers recognized
the limitations of the rule of law, they attempted to institutionalize the notion in the
U.S. Constitution. Because they understood
that the rule of law entailed more than mere
obedience to formal, procedural norms, they
were convinced that it would serve as the
most useful form of protection against the
abuse of power by arbitrary government.
While the rule of law could not itself guarantee society the benefits of individual
liberty, they understood that certain procedural standards, implied by the rule of law
ideal, could promote the conditions that
made liberty possible.
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